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Abstract 
The Montevideo Convention of the Rights and Duties of States (1933) codified the declarative 
theory  of  statehood  as  accepted  as  part  of  customary  international  law  and  laid  down  the  five 
requirements for statehood which are often summarized as ‘the principle of effectivity’: (a) permanent 
population,  (b)  defined  territory,  (c)  organised  power  (government)  and  (d)  ability  to  enter  into 
relations  with  other  states.  The  aim  of  this  article  is  to  discuss  the  possibility  of  an  additional 
requirement:  popular  sovereignty  in  a  specific  historic  sense.  I  will  also  discuss  whether  this 
requirement  should  be  regarded  as  a  necessary  and/or  sufficient  condition  for  statehood.  The 
importance of this additional condition will be explained in the light of the legitimacy of exercise of 
power.  Furthermore,  it  will  be  argued  that  this  additional  requirement  may  help  promote  the 
suggested primary goal of international law, that being justice (instead of peace as easily inferred by 
the  UN  Charter)  in  the  specific  sense  of  the  protection  of  basic  human  rights,  as  suggested  by 
Buchanan in Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination. It has to be noted that both main points, 
namely Buchanan’s suggested notion of justice as the primary goal of international law and my main 
argument of popular sovereignty in a specific historical sense as a requirement of statehood are not to 
be regarded as relating to any form of Natural Law Theory. It is not the case that I maintain that any 
international norm which violates justice as ethical foundation of international law is, because of that 
reason, legally invalid. Although the Legal Positivism vs Natural Law Theory is certainly not the focus 
of this paper, if one wishes to regard Legal Positivism and Natural Law Theory as mutually exclusive, 
my suggestion falls entirely under the umbrella of Legal Positivism for reasons that will be explained. 
Keywords: statehood, constitutive and declarative theory, popular sovereignty, goal 
of international law, human rights 
1. Introduction 
This  paper  covers  the  matter  of  the  conditions  of  statehood,  based  on  moral 
foundations of international law. I agree with the distinction between the requirements for 
recognition  of  an  entity  as  a  state  (the  criteria  for  statehood)  and  the  requirements  for 
recognition of a state, that is, the preconditions for entering into optional or discretionary 
relations with it (the conditions for recognition)
1. The former is a legal issue, specifically an 
issue of international law, whereas the latter is partly legal though mostly a political issue, 
since several states decide to recognize or not to recognize each other often on political 
considerations. This became very obvious during the Cold War where certain states would not 
recognize other states mostly, if not entirely, because of the difference in political regimes. 
This paper deals only with the criteria for statehood, not for the conditions for recognition. In 
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particular, the argument made is a deontological argument: what is argued is not how the law 
is, but what the criteria of statehood ought to be, based on a moral/philosophical foundation of 
international law. The studied matter is important because although states and international 
organisations are still, despite the rise of transnational law, the main subjects of international 
law, the law regarding the creation of states is problematic. Whether an entity is a state is 
often a debatable and controversial issue. The Montevideo Convention (1933) has not been 
applied consistently while the International Law Commission, through, Crawford, its former 
Special  Rapporteur  on  state  responsibility,  has  taken  up  the  issue  advancing  highly 
contestable criteria of legality as conditions for statehood
2. Therefore, the debate regarding 
what the conditions of statehood remains contemporary and important for the future of states 
and the development of international law. I will try to answer this matter by explaining why 
both the constitutive and declarative theory are problematic, then by presenting popular 
sovereignty as a requirement for statehood and then by providing a moral basis of this 
requirement on justice, in the sense of realization of human rights, as what the primary goal of 
international law ought to be. Finally, the relation between the paper and the already existent 
literature -which is often drowned in elaborate analyses of state practice and de lege lata 
conditions- is that advanced criteria of statehood, like the criteria of legality mentioned above, 
have not been based on any moral/philosophical foundations of international law. 
2. Content 
2.1. The two competing theories of state recognition: Constitutive and 
Declarative theory 
According to the Constitutive theory of statehood, a state is a subject of international 
law if, and only if, it is recognized as sovereign by other states
3. Because of this, new states 
cannot immediately become part of the international community or be bound by international 
law, and recognized nations do not have to respect international law in their dealings with 
them
4.  
By contrast, according to the declarative theory, an entity’s statehood is independent 
of its recognition by other states. This is stated in the Article 2 of the Montevideo Convention 
on the Rights and Duties of States (1933). More specifically, the declarative theory, as stated 
in  the  Article  1  of  the  aforementioned  Convention,  identifies  the  state  as  a  person  in 
international  law if it meets  the following criteria: 1)  a defined territory, 2)  a permanent 
population, 3) a government and 4) a capacity to enter into relations with other states.  
The  declaratory  theory  concentrates  on  the  internal  factual  situation  and  the 
constitutive theory concentrates on the external legal rights  and duties. They both miss a 
portion of the analysis
5.  
2.2. State practice 
Although one might expect that the international realm would strictly follow the declarative 
theory of state recognition because of the fact that it is the one expressly stipulated in an 
international  convention,  state  practice  seems  to  be  situated  somewhat  between  the  two 
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theories
6.  In  particular,  both  Croatia  and  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  were  recognized  as 
independent states by European Community member states and admitte d to membership of 
the United Nations (which, according to article 4 of the UN Charter, is limited to states) in 
1992 at a time where in both states non -governmental forces controlled substantial areas of 
the territories in question in civil war conditions. Also, recognition is often withheld when a 
new state is regarded as illegitimate or has come about in breach of international law. Almost 
universal non-recognition by the international community of Rhodesia and Northern Cyprus 
are good examples of this.  In the former case, recognition was widely withheld when the 
white minority seized power and attempted to form a state along the lines of Apartheid South 
Africa, a move that the  United Nations Security Council   described as the creation of an 
"illegal racist minority r￩gime"
7. In the latter case, recognition was widely withheld from a 
regime created in Northern Cyprus on land illegally invaded by Turkey in 1974
8. In general, it 
seems that Broms is right to observe that in actual practice, the criteria are ma inly political 
rather legal
9. 
2.3. Popular sovereignty as a requirement of statehood 
I  suggest  that  popular  sovereignty  in  a  specific  historical  sense  be  regarded  as  a 
necessary requirement for statehood. This is a clearly deontological statement, so I argue why 
it should be so, without making any ontological claims. The popular sovereignty requirement 
that I am advancing is as follows: a necessary requirement for a regime to be a state is that at 
one specific point in time, the majority of an identifiable number of people permanently living 
within an identifiable territory and having a government freely vote
10 for a constitution. For 
the action of voting to be free, voters must be exercising self -rule or in other words their 
individual autonomy, the standard requirements
11 of which are the following: 
a)  The action has to be intentional, i.e. the voters must intentionally be performing the 
action  of  expressing  their  opinion  of  whether  they  want  to  bring  that  specific 
constitution into effect. In a hypothetical imaginative scenario where voters vote for a 
constitution while intending to vote for inclusion to another state, then their action 
does not count as a free action. 
b)  The action has to be based on sufficient understanding. Several reasons can cause lack 
of understanding, two of which are lack of information and lack of mental capacities 
of understanding which should also exclude children. Adequate information requires 
that the people have been informed of the constitution well advance so that they had 
enough time to read it and hopefully reflect on it. 
c)  The action has to be free from external constraints. These include physical barriers 
deliberately imposed by others and different forms of coercion, including deliberate 
use of force or the threat of harm. The coercer’s purpose is to get the person being 
coerced  to  do  something  that  that  person  would  not  actually  be  willing  to  do. 
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Therefore, for example, if people are threatened that if they vote for the constitution 
the nearby state will invade, then the act of voting is not free. 
d)  The action has to be free from internal constraints. Examples of internal constraints are 
intense fears and acute pain as they influence people to make choices that represent 
departures from their stable values and usual priorities. Therefore, for example, voting 
which takes part right after a regime causes the emotion of extreme fear is not free. 
2.4. Popular sovereignty: necessary and/or sufficient condition for statehood? 
I suggest that a regime should not be able to obtain the status of statehood unless it 
satisfies the popular sovereignty requirement. Therefore, popular sovereignty is a necessary 
condition  for  statehood.  Now  I  want  to  explore  whether  popular  sovereignty  is  also  a 
sufficient condition for statehood. 
It would be hard to imagine a state that does not satisfy the first three requirements of 
the Montevideo Convention – territory, population and government. A regime that does not 
satisfy these criteria is a regime that would probably not be relevant to the discussion of 
statehood.  Therefore,  one  could  conclude,  if  the  requirement  of  popular  sovereignty  is 
accepted, it can only be a necessary but not sufficient condition, because it being sufficient 
condition  would  entail  that  a  regime  can  be  a  state  without  satisfying  those  three 
requirements, which sounds absurd.  
If  that’s  the  case,  then  how  does  the  constitutive  theory  make  any  sense?  If  the 
constitutive theory means that recognition by other states is necessary and sufficient condition 
for  state  recognition  whereas  the  territory/population/government  requirements  are  not 
necessary conditions and a regime can be a state without them as long as it is recognized by 
other states, then the constitutive theory would be equally absurd. Notably, the distinction 
between the two theories is not that these three requirements are regarded as necessary by the 
declarative theory alone whereas constitutive theory does not regard them as necessary, but 
the issue of recognition
12. The difference between the two theories is that the constitutive  
theory makes statehood contingent on recognition from other states, whereas the declarative 
theory does not. Therefore, to make more sense of the constitutive theory, one would have to 
include the territory/population/government requirements in order to be able to talk about any 
kind of regime at the first place. Seen in this light, the constitutive theory implies the three 
aforementioned  requirements.  By  the  same  token,  popular  sovereignty  can  be  seen  as 
implying, and thus necessarily including the territ ory/population/government requirements. 
This would mean that when referring to certain people freely voting for a constitution, we 
assume that we are referring to an identifiable group of people, permanently living within an 
identifiable territory and havi ng a form of government which would allow the people to 
decide whether to vote for a constitution. This does not seem to me to be too much of a 
stretch. 
The requirement that has been left out is the capacity to enter into relations with other 
states. According to the popular sovereignty theory I am proposing, it is not the case that 
capacity to enter into relations with other states is a necessary condition for statehood as the 
declarative theory suggests. By contrast, the popular sovereignty theory I am su ggesting 
regards the capacity to enter into relations with other states as a consequence of statehood, so 
the existence of the capacity necessarily requires that the status of statehood has been 
obtained first. 
A comment that many would feel ought to be made here is that states are not the only 
ones which enter into relations with states. International organisations and other non state 
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entities enter into relations with other states. Therefore, it could be argued that entering into 
relations with states is not by itself a manifestation of statehood. This is entirely true and I 
have two comments to make here. Firstly, the issue of non state entities entering into relations 
with states leaves my argument entirely unaffected because I do not maintain that entering 
into relations with states is a characteristic of states alone. What I am suggesting is that in the 
case of state recognition in particular, we can see the capacity of entering into relations with 
other states as a consequence of statehood and not as a requirement. This position is neutral to 
whether  non  state  entities  can  enter  into  relations  with  other  states,  though  modern 
international law and the emergence of transnational law make it relatively easy to provide a 
straightforward answer. Besides, if one would want to entertain the grammatical stipulation of 
the theory, reliance on  the word ‘other’ in  the expression ‘other states’ suggests that the 
capacity of entering into relations with other states in the context of this discussion has to do 
with states alone, which is rather unsurprising since both the constitutive and the declarative 
theory are theories of statehood and should not be seen as making any claims regarding non 
state entities. 
Therefore, if one wants to get on board with the popular sovereignty theory, he would 
be confronted with three choices. The first choice would be to regard the popular sovereignty 
requirement which necessarily encompasses the territory/population/government element as a 
necessary and sufficient condition for statehood. The second choice would be to keep the 
articulation of the declarative theory, at the same time enjoying the privilege of being closer 
to the letter of the theory laid down in codified international law, and merely add the popular 
sovereignty  condition  as  another  necessary  but  not  sufficient  condition.  In  this  case,  the 
popular  sovereignty  condition  would  be  deprived  of  the  territory/population/government 
element in order to avoid repetition and one would also require a capacity of entering into 
relations with other states. Finally, the last choice would be the same as the second one, but 
without the capacity of entering into relations with other states as that would be regarded as a 
consequence of statehood and not a requirement. I strongly believe that the important issue is 
whether one would accept the popular sovereignty in the historical sense as I presented it, 
namely  the  fact  that  at  one  specific  point  in  time  a  group  of  people  freely  voted  for  a 
constitution,  as  a  necessary  condition  of  statehood.  I  regard  the  choice  among  the  three 
aforementioned options as a minor issue. Personally, I opt for the first option for two main 
reasons. Firstly, presenting popular sovereignty in that rich sense as a necessary and sufficient 
condition makes it clear that in the discussion of statehood, the important component is the 
voting of a constitution. Besides, the territory and the population do not have to be exact, but 
merely  identifiable.  The  government  does  not,  officially  at  least,  need  to  satisfy  any 
internal/substantial criteria, i.e. it does not need to particularly democratic, observe human 
rights, or be a ‘good’ government in any substantial sense. Although many theorists advance 
the  suggestion  that  governments  must  be  democratic,  it  is  not  the  case  –  fortunately  or 
unfortunately  -  that  international  law  requires  democracy  as  a  necessary  condition  for 
statehood. Therefore, some flexibility is allowed in these conditions. On the contrary, the 
voting of the constitution has  to  be free  according to  the requirements  mentioned above. 
Besides, when there is a discussion about whether a regime should obtain statehood, it is 
usually  the  case  that  it  enjoys  the  territory/population/government  criteria,  or  else  the 
discussion would not arise. The second and relevant reason is that popular sovereignty, being 
in the centre of this theory, is exactly what is justified by what I agree to be regarded as being 
the primary goal of international law, namely justice in the sense of a minimum protection of 
basic human rights. 
Although  the  elements  of  territory/population/government/capacity  to  enter  in 
relations  with  other  states  –  when  seen  independently  and  irrelevant  to  the  popular 
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and which may be resulting in gross injustices, there is a certain moral aspect in the right of a 
group  to  govern  themselves  with  a  constitution.  This  requirement  is  in  line  with  the 
recognized notion of self-determination. (I am intentionally avoiding any reference to ‘right’ 
of self-determination, as it seems to me the case that self-determination can itself be broken 
sown in several other rights, but this is irrelevant to this discussion which about statehood, not 
self-determination). 
2.5. Justice as the primary goal of international law 
There are two compelling reasons for accepting the theory of popular sovereignty I 
stated above as the theory of statehood. Firstly, it is obviously more democratic, because it is 
based on the direct will of the people, or at least the majority of the people. Secondly, and in 
my opinion more importantly, it promotes what Buchanan in Justice, Legitimacy and Self-
Determination rightly advances as a de lege ferenda primary goal of international law, namely 
justice, in the sense of protection of basic human rights. Justice is better served when human 
rights are observed. 
I agree with Buchanan that it is reasonable to regard justice, meaning protection of 
basic human rights, as the primary goal of international law
13. Justice largely subsumes peace. 
Justice requires the prohibition of wars of aggression because wars of aggression inherently 
violate human rights. To that extent, the pursuit of justice is the pursuit of peace. Sometimes, 
justice requires violating peace and the fight of the Allies in the Second World War when they 
fought to stop fascist aggression with all its massive violations of human rights meets out 
moral intuitions that in such cases justice is worth more than peace. In addition to this 
rationale, Buchanan also brings two arguments regarding why justice is morally imperative
14. 
Although I find his two arguments very convincing, I feel I am not required to refer to them 
because they are not necessary for my argument, which is that popular sovereignty theory of 
statehood is preferable. All that is needed to support this argument is that justice is preferable 
to peace when it comes to being the primary goal of international law. The fact that in cases of 
conflict the weight goes to justice instead of peace is enough t o make my point and I do not 
need to ground justice as a primary goal of international law any further, as this is not my 
main point.  
Here I have to state that although I agree with Buchanan with justice being the primary 
goal of international law, the popular sovereignty theory I advance departs from Buchanan’s 
theory on statehood, which disregards the issue of popular sovereignty, holding the position 
that statehood ought to be granted to entities that observe human rights. Although I find his 
theory  very  persuasive  and  much  better  grounded  than  either  the  constitutive  or  the 
declarative theory, I think the popular sovereignty theory has two simple advantages over 
Buchanan’s theory. Firstly, the popular sovereignty theory is much more easily observed, and 
in this specific sense, much more realistic. Buchanan’s suggestion requires the existence and 
impartial functioning of institutions that would observe whether the entity in question actually 
observes  human rights.  Although  I  am  very sympathetic to  this idea,  I am  very doubtful 
whether institutions will necessarily be unbiased simply because they are non state entities. 
Secondly, although protecting human rights is indeed in full accordance with the definition of 
justice, when it comes to statehood in particular, what must also be seriously considered is the 
issue of the will of the people. Let’s suppose that within a given territory, entity A is striving 
for statehood. Entity A does refer to an identifiable population within identifiable territory and 
with a form of government. Let’s suppose that this entity actually observes human rights and 
the protection of human rights is way above the minimum level of protection expected by the 
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international community. However, for reasons  irrelevant to human rights, people are not 
happy  with  that  constitution.  For  example  let’s  suppose  that  that  constitution  lays  down 
processes which slow down the system and reduce dramatically the economic development of 
the  country  and  that  these  processes  are  laid  down  in  non  amendable  clauses  of  the 
constitution. Since there cannot be two entities A, let’s suppose that there is a metaphysical 
world, exactly identical to this one, but in the respective entity, let’s call it “A”, which has the 
same population, territory and government, the system again observes and protects human 
rights, but the level of protection of human rights is insignificantly lower than the level of 
protection provided by entity A but of course, again, much higher than the minimum level of 
protection expected by the international community. However, the people in entity “A” are 
much happier with the constitution they freely voted and the economic development of their 
entity. It seems to me that it would not be unreasonable to hold that the entity the international 
community would preferably be granting statehood to is entity “A”. 
I do not wish to diminish Buchanan’s view; on the contrary, I find it very convincing 
and a path of development of contemporary international law. I definitely regard it as a great 
progress in comparison to the constitutive and declarative theories. However, I believe that 
there  can  be  reasonable  alternatives  that  take  into  account  other  factors  apart  from  the 
protection of human rights when it comes to an all-things-considered decision about which 
theory is most appropriate for statehood. That said, I totally agree with Buchanan as justice in 
the sense of protection of human rights as the primary goal of international law. 
2.6. Stepping into Natural Law? 
In short, no. Both main points, namely Buchanan’s suggested notion of justice as the 
primary goal of international law and my main argument of popular sovereignty in a specific 
historical sense as a requirement of statehood are not to be regarded as relating to any kind of 
Natural Law Theory. It is not the case that I maintain that any international norm which 
violates justice as ethical foundation of international law is, because of that reason, legally 
invalid.  
Regardless of the specific legal positivist position that different philosophers of law 
might take, e.g. Kelsen and Hart who are both legal positivists but greatly disagree in many 
points, I take the main proposition of Legal Positivism per se to be the following: In any legal 
system, whether a norm is legally valid, and hence whether it forms part of the law of that 
system,  depends  on  its  sources,  not  its  merits
15.  Therefore,  if  one  maintains  that  an 
international legal norm is valid because of its sources, or, in other words, that the reason of 
validity of an international legal norm  is its sources, then this view would fall under the 
umbrella of positivist views. By contrast, if one regards that an international legal norm is 
valid because of its merits, or, in other words, that the merits of the law – e.g. whether the law 
if moral or immoral based on whatever theory – are the reason of validity of an international 
legal norm, then this view would fall under Natural Law Theory.  
Although one may be mislead by the use of morality in the goals of international law, 
it is incorrect to assume that just because of the reference to a certain kind of moral value, this 
moral value is to be regarded as a criterion of validity of norms. That is most certainly not the 
case here. Neither Buchanan nor I make such claims. The claim that a norm is invalid because 
it is against justice is not made here. On the contrary, I hold that justice is not the goal of 
international law, but it ought to be. This is a deontological, not an ontological statement. As 
Buchanan puts it ‘justice is a goal in the sense of an ideal state of affairs, a moral target that 
we aim at, and which we can strive to continue to approach more closely, even if it is not 
                                                 
15 John Gardner, ‘Legal Positivism: 51/2 Myths,’ American Journal of Jurisprudence 46 (2001): 199. 752    Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Political Sciences, European Studies and IR 
 
possible ever to achieve it fully or perfectly’
16. In practice, this goal has to do with many 
issues, e.g. how international law ought to develop, how international legal norms ought to be 
laid  down,  minimum  requirements  of  the  content  of  international  legal  norms,  principles 
governing  international  institutions,  what  functions  we  ought  to  see  international  law  as 
having,  etc., but  it is  most  certainly not  to  say that justice is  a  criterion of validity. We 
therefore accept that unjust laws are, sadly, legally valid because of their sources. 
Similarly, I do not maintain that international legal norms according to which states 
have already obtained statehood or norms according to which entities will obtain statehood in 
the future are in any way invalid because they were or might be unjust. On the contrary, I 
recognize the declarative theory of statehood as the legally valid international norm regarding 
statehood (even though it has not always been applied with absolute consistency) and I am 
suggesting that it ought to change in the future.  
Therefore, although Legal Positivism per se is not within the scope of this discussion, 
if  one  wishes  to  place  these  theories  in  the  Legal  Positivism  vs  Natural  Law  Theory 
discussion, then both Buchanan’s theory of justice – with which I obviously agree- as the 
primary goal of international law and my theory of popular sovereignty as a requirement of 
statehood are both legal positivist and not natural law theories.   
3. Conclusions 
In conclusion, I have briefly referred to the two main competitive theories of statehood 
in  international  law  and  then  advanced  my  theory  of  popular  sovereignty  as  a  necessary 
and/or sufficient condition of statehood. I stated that there are three ways one could follow 
using  the  popular  sovereignty  argument  in  relation  to  the  territory/population/government 
requirements and the requirement of the capacity to enter relations with other states. I stated 
that I personally prefer the first version in which popular sovereignty is more robust and has a 
richer content, including the territory/population/government requirements. I then explained 
how my theory is justified by Buchanan’s position – with which I agree- that justice, in the 
sense of protection of basic human rights, and not peace, ought to be the primary goal of 
international law. I then offered reasons why I depart from Buchanan’s notion of statehood 
according to which requirement for statehood ought to be protection of basic human rights, 
excluding popular sovereignty. Lastly, I explained why neither Buchanan’s theory nor my 
suggestion of popular sovereignty have to be confused with any Natural Law Theory, and that 
as regards the Legal Positivism vs Natural Law Theory debate, this discussion remains within 
the limits of the former. If the idea of popular sovereignty as a requirement for statehood 
based on justice as a primary goal of international law is adhered to, the discussion regarding 
conditions of statehood will be geared in a direction of justice which will satisfy peoples’ 
moral and legal intuitions. Finally, further research must be done, especially in the detailed 
structure  of  the  idea  of  popular  sovereignty  in  the  modern  transnational  world.  Further 
questions should be answered, e.g. whether the idea of popular sovereignty as a requirement 
for  statehood  should  remain  in  a  narrow  framework  as  conceived  by  Rousseau,  i.e. 
delimitation of state sovereignty rested on a contract between people and government, or if 
the  idea  of  popular  sovereignty  as  a  condition  for  statehood  should  lie  within  the  more 
contemporary framework of procedural popular sovereignty.  
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